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reverse
Judgment.

I.

Respondent's Request For Attorney Fees Should Be Denied

In Respondent's Brief, Respondent-Defendant Ronald D. Christian ("Christian"),
fails to provide a basis for an award of fees on appeal. See Respondent's Brief, p. 5. There
is no argument or citation to authority supporting the basis for an award of attorney fees.

See Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 874 (1999) (ruling
"[w]here a party requesting attorney fees on appeal cites the applicable statutes but does
not present argument with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor,
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied on, we
will not address the request."); Carroll v. MBNA Am. Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 270 (2009)
(ruling to be entitled to attorney fees on appeal, authority and argument establishing a right
to fees must be presented in the first brief filed, mere citation to statute or rules is
insufficient).
Second, Molen is requesting this Court to resolve an issue of first impression in this
case. Cases of first impression do not constitute an area of settled law and therefore an
is not

c,n,'SY'n,,._,.,

a

V.

malpractice cases prove the additional element
not preclude this Court from adopting

a

actual innocence. Further, Lamb does

exoneration rule. In fact,

m

strongly supports adoption of the "exoneration rule," as discussed in Molen's Opening
Brief. In this case, there was no objective proof of some actual damage until Molen
obtained post-conviction relief.
Yet, Christian argues that this Court's decision in Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho
269 (1996), established that actual innocence is a required element in a criminal legal

malpractice case. Respondent's Brief, pp. 5-8. This was the position Christian repeatedly
urged the district court to acknowledge, but the district court repeatedly declined.
After hearing on Christian's Motion to Dismiss on April 9, 2015, Christian filed a
Supplemental Authority in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, attaching the Lamb
v. Manweiler opinion. (R, pp. 74-81). In its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, the district

court found Lamb "does not identify actual innocence as an element of a legal malpractice
action arising from representation in a criminal case

it just says that element was not in

dispute in Lamb. (R, p. 87). Next, Christian filed his Motion for Summary Judgment, the
on

procedural

Lamb case.

pp. 250-58).

court

1s an

a

malpractice claim.
While Christian is correct that the Idaho

of

that actual

innocence is an additional element that a plaintiff must prove in a criminal legal malpractice
case, See Respondent's Motion to Augment Record, Ex. A ("A.R"), p. 6., the Idaho
Supreme Court did not confirm, affirm, or even address the Idaho Court of Appeals'
holding on that issue. Rather, the Court's decision in Lamb effectively vacated the Idaho
Court of Appeals opinion. In fact, the Court's decision was based on the element of
proximate cause, not actual innocence. After reviewing the record of Lamb's change of
plea hearing the Court ruled:
From the transcript of the pleas it is clear that [Lamb] knew the elements
and knew the facts. He knew that he might have a defense to the charges
before he pled guilty. He also knew the choice of whether to plead guilty
was his, not that of his attorney. The choices he had were explained by the
district judge and acknowledged by Mr. Lamb. The proximate cause of any
damage he may have suffered is the decision to plead guilty following a
thorough advice of rights by the district judge concerning the charge.
Lamb, 129 Idaho at 274. Thus, the Court affirmed the district court's decision granting

summary judgment to Manweiler, but based its decision on different reasoning.
contrast to

reasoning, both

court

additional element was not disputed by Lamb, at the district court level or on appeal. (R.,
149). However, the Court of Appeals ruled sua sponte that actual

was an

additional element A.R., p. 6. The Court of Appeals found that affidavits attached to
Lamb's post-conviction proceeding set forth facts that controverted Lamb's guilt and
created a genuine issue of fact concerning Lamb's actual innocence. Id. at pp. 9-11.
A review of the three Lamb decisions above demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme
Court did not confirm that actual innocence is an additional element in a criminal legal
malpractice case. All three courts based their decisions on distinct reasoning. The district
court ruled that Lamb failed to establish a genuine issue of fact concerning his innocence,
and therefore he could not establish the proximate cause element. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the record contained an issue of material fact concerning Lamb's actual
innocence, and noted without addressing, that proximate cause is a distinct element. The
Idaho Supreme Court did not engage in any discussion of Lamb's guilt or innocence, and
only noted that the element of actual innocence was not in dispute. The Court based its
decision specificalJy on the element of proximate cause ("The proximate cause of any
have

IS

decision to plead guilty .

mt,ernret,awm of Lamb v.
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"considered but did not adopt the exoneration rule" advanced by Manweiler in his petition
to the Idaho Supreme Court. Respondent's Brief,

15. While it is correct that Manweiler

argued for the Court to adopt an exoneration rule, just like the actual innocence element,
the Court did not address the exoneration rule in its decision. That is because the Court
made its ruling specifically on the element of proximate cause. More importantly,
Manweiler raised the exoneration rule issue for the first time in his petition to the Idaho
Supreme Court. (R., p. 227) ("This defense was not raised as an affirmative defense in
[Manweiler' s] answer to the complaint ... nor at the summary judgment proceedings ...
nor, until now, has it been raised as an issue on appeal."). Thus, it was not an issue properly
before the Court in Lamb, and Christian's assertion that the Court considered but did not
adopt the exoneration rule is not supported by the facts in that case.
Next, Christian suggests that an actual innocence requirement and an exoneration
requirement are mutually exclusive. In his brief he states:
The distinction is, states such as Idaho require actual innocence as an
element of proof in an attorney malpractice case, and states that follow the
exoneration rule require a showing of 'legal' innocence prior to allowing a
plaintiff to proceed with a malpractice action; thus, exoneration is an
proof an attorney malpractice case those states.
Respondent's

an

case,
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(requiring proof

legal innocence); Shaw v. State Dep't

P.2d 566

1993) (requiring actual innocence); Therrien v. Sullivan, 891 A.2d 560 (N.H. 2006). In
fact, in arguing that this Court should adopt the additional element of actual innocence,
Christian quotes language from Falkner v. Foshaug, 29 P.3d 771 (2001). Respondent's
Brief, p. 14. In Falkner, the Court of Appeals of Washington held that "both a successful
postconviction challenge and proof of innocence are necessary to maintain a criminal
malpractice claim." Id. at 773.
Based upon the above, Molen submits that the decision in Lamb v. Manweiler does
not require that a plaintiff in a criminal malpractice cases prove the additional element of
actual innocence. Further, the decision in Lamb does not preclude this Court from adopting
the exoneration rule.

III.

Molen's Cause Of Action Did Not Accrue Until He Was Granted PostConviction Relief

Molen maintains his position that his cause of action against Christian did not
accrue until Molen was granted post-conviction relief on June 17, 2014. Molen filed his
Compliant on February 1 2015, which is within the applicable statute oflimitations.
Christian contends that Molen had objective proof of damage when he was
convicted and sentenced in his criminal case. Respondent's
"Molen

p. 17. According to
on

was granted
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caused

damage, since the time he

actual
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crime and that Christian's ineffective assistance resulted in Molen' s conviction. That is to
Molen was aware of Christian's negligent acts

to being granted post-conviction

relief by Judge Owen. However, as the district court correctly stated: "it is not necessarily
just the negligent act of the attorney which starts the accrual of the statute of limitations.
There may be some external act after the fact which actually starts accrual." (R., p. 92).
(quoting and analyzing Minnick v. Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP, 157 Idaho 863,
868 (2015)).
Second, Judge Owen's decision granting Molen's petition for post-conviction relief
has substantial bearing on this case. When Judge Owen granted Molen' s petition Molen
had established his legal innocence of the crime. Molen' s action for criminal legal
malpractice did not accrue, for statute of limitations purposes, until he successfully
obtained post-conviction relief. Prior to that date, there was no objective proof of some
actual damage. See Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221 (1992). As recognized by the district
court, (R., p. 6; R., p. 354), the exoneration rule is an issue of first impression in Idaho.
In this case, there was no objective proof of some actual damage until Molen
post-conviction

This is within

two

Molen submits that a material issue of fact exists
obtained

some
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statute of limitations.
this case co11ce:rrung
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